International Trade – Sanctions and the Sanctity of Documentary Credits
It is a sacrosanct rule of international trade that letters of credit are to be honoured if complying documents are presented in a timely fashion. This time-honoured rule is based on the irrevocable undertaking given by issuing banks to honour a credit by paying against a complying presentation of the stipulated documents. Such banks therefore assume a simple but seemingly absolute obligation towards beneficiaries of letters of credit. However, banks also have an obligation to comply with the law and this includes laws in relation to international sanctions. Therefore, a bank may be faced with the obligation to honour a letter of credit in circumstances where any such payment would violate applicable sanctions and place the bank in jeopardy of criminal penalties or other regulatory sanctions. Banks invariably prefer to avoid such liability even if it means facing a claim by the beneficiary of a letter of credit for failure to honour a complying presentation. The solution adopted is to include a sanctions clause in the letter of credit which gives the bank the right not to honour a complying presentation where to do so would involve the bank in criminal liability for breaching laws on sanctions.
A case in Singapore considered the efficacy of such a clause and concluded that in certain circumstances it may be efficacious to protect a bank against contractual liability. The clause in question was inserted by the confirming bank in its confirmation of the credit to the beneficiary. Although it was not found in the letter of credit itself this was no barrier to the confirming bank relying on it. A letter of credit transaction is in reality a compound transaction involving a number of related but discrete contracts, one of which being the contract between the confirming bank and the beneficiary. The clause in question read:
[JPMorgan] must comply with all sanctions, embargo and other laws and regulations of the U.S. and of other applicable jurisdictions to the extent they do not conflict with such U.S. laws and regulations (‘applicable restrictions’). Should documents be presented involving any country, entity, vessel or individual listed in or otherwise subject to any applicable restriction, we shall not be liable for any delay or failure to pay, process or return such documents or for any related disclosure of information.
The bank took the view that the ship which carried the coal which was the subject of the sale contract pursuant to which the buyer applied for and obtained the letter of credit was the subject of US sanctions against Syria because the bank had information to suggest the ship was previously registered by a Syrian entity and, therefore, a red flag was raised internally that the change of registration to a non-Syrian entity may not have resulted in a change in the beneficial ownership. The US Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) appeared to support the bank’s position by stating that payment in these circumstances would involve violation of the US Syrian sanctions regime.
On appeal to Singapore’s highest court the bank failed. While the sanctions clause in the bank’s confirmation was upheld as a valid contractual clause, the court decided that the evidence before the court pointing to the supposed Syrian ownership of the vessel was inconclusive. OFAC’s opinion did not change the fact that the objective evidence was not good enough to meet the standard of proof required by a court. In refusing to pay, the bank was taking a risk-based decision i.e. that it would rather be sued by the beneficiary for failing to pay against a complying presentation than to be found by OFAC to have breached US sanctions. This was rational but not a contractually justified approach and the sanctions clause did not help the bank.
Having decided against the bank on the basis of the lack of evidence to show that the vessel remained in the beneficial ownership of a Syrian entity, the court went on to discuss the question raised by the beneficiary which was whether the sanctions clause was compatible with the commercial purpose of the bank’s confirmation. It was argued that under the UCP 600, a confirmation was “a definite undertaking of the confirming bank … to honour or negotiate a complying presentation”. A sanctions clause giving the bank the freedom not to do so because it believed the carrying ship was a sanctioned entity was contrary to this undertaking. It was all the more unjust because a beneficiary usually had no say in nominating the ship and even if it knew which ship was being used it would be difficult to determine the beneficial ownership of that ship.
This remains an open question and the court’s views on it were strictly not necessary. The court did not find the ICC’s Guidance Paper on the Use of Sanctions Clauses useful as it simply stated that “if the sanctions clauses in … letters of credit … allow the issuer a level of discretion as to whether or not to honour beyond the statutory or regulatory requirements applicable to that issuer, they bring into question the irrevocable and documentary nature of the letter of credit”. There is no guidance as to when a particular sanctions clause would cross the line. However, the court was clear that the bank’s position in the present case (i.e. that its sanctions clause entitled it to deny payment against a complying presentation as long as it finds that, on a risk-based assessment, it would prefer to be sued by the beneficiary than to risk being penalised by OFAC) would result in the sanctions clause being incompatible with the commercial purpose of the confirmations due to the significant unpredictability such an interpretation would introduce into the confirmations.
Beneficiaries must therefore be aware that a sanctions clause may be inserted in the letter of credit or separately in the confirmation of that credit and this may affect the irrevocable and documentary nature of the credit. The court’s remedy is to construe such clauses strictly and to require banks to ensure they have sufficient evidence to meet the civil standard of proof before they are allowed to deny payment to a beneficiary.
For more information relating to this article, kindly contact Partner, Probin Dass.
Disclaimer: This information is provided for general information and does not constitute legal or other professional advice. Specific advice should always be sought in relation to any legal issue.