In DFM v DFL [2024] SGCA 41 (“DFM v DFL”) the Singapore Court of Appeal (“CA”) has confirmed that a party to an arbitration may be considered to have acceded to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal for the purposes of an interim application for relief, even where it has challenged the tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide the merits of the substantive dispute in the arbitration.

The judgment of the CA serves as a cautionary statement that a party cannot effectively “reserve” an objection to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine an interim application and raise it subsequently, such as at the enforcement stage. The courts are likely to view this as an impermissible “hedging” exercise.

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Recourse to the Singapore Courts for the setting aside of an arbitration award pursuant to s 24(b) of the International Arbitration Act 1994 (the “IAA”) and/or Arts 34(2)(a)(ii) and (iii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the “Model Law”) can be a complex and intricate matter. Under Singapore law, the General Division of the High Court may set aside the award of an arbitral tribunal if there has been a breach of natural justice.

The twin pillars of natural justice are the rule against bias and the fair hearing rule. A breach of the fair hearing rule could possibly arise from the chain of reasoning that an arbitral tribunal adopts in its award, as the chain of reasoning must be one which the parties had reasonable notice of and which has sufficient nexus to the parties’ arguments. In the case where an arbitral tribunal’s chain of reasoning departs from the cases of both parties, the High Court in Vietnam Oil and Gas Group v Joint Stock Company (Power Machines – ZTL, LMZ, Electrosila Energomachexport) [2024] SGHC 244 provides valuable insight into the nuances on the remission and setting aside of arbitral awards.

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In its recent decision in Alliance Divine Impex Pte Ltd v Arulappan Tony (DBS Bank Ltd, non-party) [2024] SGHC 227 (“Alliance Divine”), the High Court of Singapore confirmed that a party can obtain bank statements directly from a bank under s 175(1) of the Evidence Act 1893 (the “EA”) for the purpose of formulating tortious claims against a prospective defendant.

However, the court emphasised that s 175(1) of the EA itself did not provide a substantive basis for a party to seek disclosure from a bank. Instead, a party seeking disclosure under s 175(1) had to demonstrate that it had a substantive right to the documents independent of s 175(1).

Therefore, parties seeking to obtain disclosure of banking documents of a prospective defendant directly from such defendant’s bank would be well-advised to seek legal assistance to ensure they can show a substantive right to disclosure, independent of s 175(1) of the EA, prior to making such an application.

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Winding up a debtor company based on its inability to make payment on a statutory demand pursuant to s 125(1)(e) read with s 125(2)(a) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (the “IRDA”) is an option that is frequently pursued by creditors. Under Singapore law, both the statutory demand and the subsequent winding up application are required to be duly served on the debtor company before a winding up order can be made by the Courts.

From time to time, the usual method of service by leaving the documents at the registered address of the debtor company pursuant to s 125(2)(a) of the IRDA becomes unavailable and creditors are faced with the dilemma of which alternative method of service should be utilised. In this context the judgment of the Singapore High Court in Maybank Singapore Limited v Dynamiq Solution Pte Ltd (Official Receiver, non-party) [2024] SGHC 219(“Maybank v Dynamic Solution”) provides useful and rare insight into the nuances of the rules of service and potential pitfalls that creditors may face.

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“The Singapore Court of Appeal (the “CA”) has made it clear in its recent decision in The “Sea Justice” [2024] SGCA 32 that where admiralty in rem proceedings in Singapore have been stayed on the ground of forum non conveniens (a “forum non conveniens stay”) a claimant which has previously obtained a security against arrest will not be allowed to retain it with a view to taking advantage of the higher limits on liability that may be available in Singapore.

While the decision was rendered in the context of admiralty proceedings, it suggests that any party seeking to impose conditions on a forum non conveniens stay of Singapore proceedings will have its arguments carefully scrutinized by the Singapore courts.

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“In its recent decision in Winson Oil Trading Pte Ltd v Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd [2024] SGCA 31, the Singapore Court of Appeal (“CA”) clarified a key principle of the fraud exception to the payment obligation under letters of credit (the “Fraud Exception”)

In particular, the CA confirmed that the common law definition of fraud as enunciated in Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Case 337 (“Derry v Peek”) and which extends to recklessness in making a false representation applies in considering if a presentation under a letter of credit falls within the Fraud Exception.

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